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Introduction
Throughout the twentieth century, European wel-
fare states led to the creation of new rights and
the redistribution of wealth, making the reduction
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of economic and social
inequality the guarantee of
a “decent society” (Spitz
2012) that is both long-lasting
and just. “Freeing man from
need” created a link between
social justice and economic
prosperity (Supiot 2010).
National solidarity, as it was
conceived of during the post-war period, was
accompanied by a Keynesian approach to the
economy: social protection and redistribution
functioned as stabilisers during periods of crisis
by supporting demand during recessions, thus
preventing the collapse of economic activity.
The interplay between the market, the welfare
state and the family took a different shape
in different countries (Esping-Andersen 1990;
Sainsbury 1994). However, in all countries, this
interplay was based on a gender-based division
of work in which women took on domestic and
familial responsibilities, while men entered the
labour market via the workforce. This model,
known as the “male breadwinner model” (Land
1980) discouraged paid work for women (in
particular married women and mothers). And yet,
from the 1960s onwards, the presence of women
in the labour market continued to increase. The
rise of the female workforce and the resulting
transformations of familial norms (increase in the
number of divorces, common-law unions, etc.)
called the male breadwinner model into question
(Pe´rivier 2015). This shift was supported by
political forces (including feminist movements)
that called for women’s rights and also by a
favourable economic climate
characterised by strong eco-
nomic growth and a need
for labour. The path towards
potential economic emanci-
pation via the labour mar-
ket thus emerged, even if
equality in the workplace
was far from being a reality.
From the 1970s onwards, the various eco-
nomic and social crises experienced by western
societies led to a renewal of liberal theses put
forward by the Chicago School of economists
and in particular Milton Friedman. Welfare state
interventions were henceforth seen to distort opti-
mal choices by agents,1 thus disrupting the laws
of the market. The political version of this per-
spective took the shape of ultra-liberalism in the
Thatcher/Reagan era (Audard 2009). In the US and
the UK, policies for the redistribution of wealth
and social programmes designed to combat poverty
were reduced (Pe´rivier 2012). This questioning of
the welfare state which varied in intensity depend-
ing on the country, partly explains why new types of
justification in support of equality policies emerged.
The early twenty-first century is characterised
by a global economic and political crisis. In this
context, the narrative is that policies aiming to
ensure equality and tackle discrimination must be
shown to “perform” well for decision-makers to
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remain convinced that priority should be given
to implementing the principle of equality. Such
“performance” is measured in terms of a cost-
benefit analysis carried out from an economic and
social perspective. We analyse public justification
of contemporary policies on gender equality and
anti-discrimination in order to highlight the conse-
quences of this approach.
Contemporary public debate includes a num-
ber of ideas such as: “women do politics differently,
women manage differently”, “more women at
decision-making level in private companies pro-
vides added value”, “diversity is good for busi-
ness”, “tackling discrimination is profitable”, etc.
Are these arguments part of an effective and well-
meaning pragmatism, or are they part of a conser-
vative ideology that has been revamped to make it
appear more respectable? Is this type of argument
part of a strategy adopted by defenders of equality
to circumvent neoliberal ideas by using their own
arms against them, or, on the contrary, is it the sign
of a victory for neoliberal strategies (Fraser 2009)?
Whatever the intention, the result is that when
equality as a principle in itself is superseded to
serve economic ends, it becomes depoliticised.
Historically, cost-benefit calculations did lead to
social and economic progress but also to social
regression. While the need for qualified labour dur-
ing the 1960s led to the removal of political barriers
that prevented women from joining the workforce,
economic realism also led to policies that were
unfavourable to the employment of women. In
France, the 1994 reform of the allocation parentale
d’e´ducation (parental leave allowance) was facili-
tated by the wish to limit mass unemployment by
encouraging unskilled mothers to take three years’
leave for which they would receive 50 per cent of the
minimum wage if they stayed at home to look after
their child. For equality policies to be structural and
not merely a response to a given political or eco-
nomic context, they must be designed according to
an unconditional, self-sufficient and non-negotiable
principle of justice (Se´nac 2015, 2016). Collateral
benefits are possible but they must not supersede
the political aim.
The first part of this article will look at the
role of equality in market regulation in order to
shed light on the complex links between economic
development and social progress. In the second
part, we show that today, justifications of equality
policies tend to be based on cost-benefit analyses
which validate them in the name of the economic
and social benefits expected when they are imple-
mented. This approach will allow us to analyse how
the foundations of equality and social justice are
weakened when the supposed or imagined gains
of equality policies and the anti-discrimination
struggle are put in the foreground rather than the
principle of justice itself. Equality that is subject to
the demonstration of how it performs is no longer
a principle but rather an option conditional on such
demonstration.
Market regulation and the
role of equality
Defined as a place for the exchange of resources,
the market contributes to social progress2 provided
it is subject to regulations that guarantee its status
as a public good and that prevent any private reap-
propriation from taking place (fraud, monopolies,
conflicts of interest, corruption, the withholding of
information, etc.). In principle, the labour market
creates access to resources for individuals (income,
salaries, careers, etc.). However, while their pres-
ence in the labour market undoubtedly provides
women with a pathway to financial independence
and freedom from the constraints of the family,
the conditions under which they are employed and
the protection female workers benefit from (labour
and social rights) determine the limits of their
emancipation through work. Three cases illustrate
the complex role played by the economy in the
egalitarian transformation of society: the principle
of equal wages in the European Common Market,
the move from welfare to workfare in the United
States and the links between gender equality and
economic growth.
The Common Market and equality
With respect to market regulation policies, gender
equality policies drafted by the European Union
highlight the tensions between the free market, reg-
ulation (Przeworski 2000) and principles of justice.
The demand for equal pay for men and women was
included in the Treaty of Rome (1957), where it
is addressed in Article 119 (which later became
Article 141). Article 119 specified that:
Each member State shall during the first phase ensure and
subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men
and women should receive equal pay for equal work.
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Given that it was conceived of with application of
the principle of competition in mind, the Article
appears to be a component part of economic policy
and common market organisation. The gaps in
social rights between the member states called for
regulation of the labour market in order to avoid
distortions brought about by competition in the
new free movement of workers of both genders
which constituted the common market. France had
introduced a law on equal pay and was particularly
concerned about unfair competition in the textile
sector, where the large majority of workers were
female (Rossilli 1997). At no point when the Article
was being drafted was the question of women’s
rights and the underlying principle of justice part of
the thought process (Hoskyns 1996). The inclusion
of the principle of equal pay in the Treaty of Rome
was thus motivated not by ethical considerations but
by economic ones. In spite of this, the principles of
justice are not entirely absent: such an approach was
part of the international context that affirmed human
rights in the post-war period. There is little point in
searching for the historical roots of the principle of
equal pay as the economic argument is inextricably
intermingled with the principle of justice. Such a
dialectic led the actors of the time to defend one
or reaffirm the other. The non-application of the
principle of equal pay may also be the result of
economic factors, as it would have led to a massive
increase of salary costs (unless male salaries
were reduced). At the end of the 1970s, driven
as it was by feminist movements, the principle
was progressively activated (Booth and Bennett
2002).
The political scientist Sophie Jacquot has anal-
ysed transformations of European gender equal-
ity policy. Her work shows the emergence of
three series of action since the Treaty of Rome.
Jacquot focuses on administrative, parliamentary,
and expert reports, archives and budget data,
together with qualitative surveys (2000–2006,
2012–2013) carried out on the political, institu-
tional, trade union and academic actors who worked
on the Treaty of Rome and up until the post-
Lisbon era. She concludes that there exists: a certain
correspondence between the stages of economic
and subsequently political integration in the EU and
the types of public policy which were successively
implemented in the area of gender equality. The
consistent factor is the internal functioning of mar-
ket logic. (Jacquot 2014, p.34)
Equal treatment was in accordance with the
market making dynamic until the Maastricht Treaty
(1992), the equal opportunity strategy with market
correcting until the Lisbon Treaty (2007), and
subsequently gender mainstreaming when social
engineering replaced economic integration. She
analyses the post-Lisbon period as a sequence
where the cognitive framework of European gender
equality policy was thrown off kilter by the eco-
nomic and budgetary crisis. “Equality became not
only a subordinate but a truly secondary and indeed
an accessory goal of the European project. In these
new circumstances, equality could thus only exist
“in spite of the market” (Jacquot 2014, p.329) in the
lowering of ambitions and a refocusing on limited
and consensual issues.
Workfare: from solidarity to individual
responsibility
Since the 1980s, discourse on the struggle to elim-
inate poverty has become hybrid, shifting from
an approach based on assistance for the poor to
an approach based on the effectiveness of social
programmes. Such a change of perspective is based
on the hypothesis that social benefits discourage
recipients from seeking employment as they have
nothing to gain financially in doing so. Benefits
turn recipients away from the labour market and
engender a spirit of dependence which is deemed
to be ineffective. The scale of this shift varies
from country to country. In the United States, from
the 1970s onward, welfare became a symbol of
a “poverty culture” and was replaced by work-
fare (Barbier 2013). During his 1976 presidential
campaign, Ronald Reagan denounced the Welfare
Queen, as an icon of social fraud (Pe´rivier 2012). He
created a sexist and racist image of black women in
Chicago suburbs sponging off the American welfare
state, living off social benefits, and cultivating a
taste for laziness. Although it had no statistical
basis, the above allegory was designed to condemn
the ineffectiveness of social programmes that were
introduced in the 1930s and continued to expand up
until the 1960s.
In the US of the 1990s, the semantics used to
defend social benefits changed from terms such as
“need, compassion, decency, eligibility” to words
such as “work, responsibility, self-sufficiency,
emancipation” (Peck 1998), thus transmitting
the idea of a reconciliation between economic
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efficiency and social justice. Workfare consisted
of intertwining social programmes and the labour
market by demanding that benefit recipients make
an effort to find a job. The aim was to reinforce
follow-up of benefit recipients to ensure a rapid
return to employment according to the basic princi-
ple that “any job is a good job”. In 1996, the social
benefits reform passed under the Clinton presidency
institutionalised workfare as a means to regulate
poverty. The social programme, Aid for Families
with Dependent Children essentially targeted sin-
gle mothers and later became Temporary Aid for
Needy Families. Eligibility for the new programme
required a minimum number of hours worked and
was limited to five years’ duration per person. The
reform was qualified by the sociologist Ann Orloff
(2006) as heralding the end of US maternalism, in
the sense that it encouraged single mothers to return
to employment instead of remaining economically
dependent on national solidarity. In terms of ending
poverty and creating access to employment, the
results are mitigated. However, the position of
women in the most precarious situations has clearly
deteriorated (Pe´rivier 2012). They face problems
with transport, childcare, and atypical and irregular
working hours. These problems are exacerbated as
single mothers tend to live in the poorest areas,
where there are few or no public services, or in
rural areas where wages are low and less likely to
extricate employees from the poverty trap. This case
illustrates the fact that although the participation of
women in the labour market is a necessary con-
dition for their emancipation, it is not enough: the
conditions under which the job is exercised, and the
type and quality of the job held are also determining
factors. The situation described shows the limits of
an approach based on individual responsibility in
the struggle against inequality and the ensuing need
to understand equality policies in their structural
and collective dimensions.
Female labour and economic growth
Increases in the number of women in the labour
market represent progress which is potentially both
a source of female emancipation and a driver of eco-
nomic growth. Economic activity corresponds to
the production of goods and services that associates
capital and labour with productivity. The literature
on what determines economic growth has existed
for a long time and is vast (Solow 1956). Recent
approaches aim to show that female inactivity in
the labour market or their lower level of education
in some countries constitutes an under-utilisation
of the labour factor. They argue that access to
education for women increases available human
capital and that women’s presence in the labour
market increases the size of the active population
and, therefore, potential growth, provided that full
employment is achieved (full employment is a situ-
ation in which frictional unemployment is confined
to a short period between two jobs). Thus, the social
advancement of women and the struggle to over-
come all impediments to their access to education
and to the labour market represent under-exploited
growth drivers. Women are seen as “a major force
of economic innovation” (Aglietta 1998) and as
“the door into a virtuous circle for the creation
of needs, activity and jobs” (Majnoni d’Intignano
1999).
Since the 2000s, international institutions have
produced a number of publications that estimate the
gains made as a result of women reaching higher
levels of education (The´venon et al. 2015) and their
access to the labour market in both high income
and low income countries (IMF 2012; OECD 2014;
Woetzel et al. 2015). Some of these publications
argue that the differences between countries in
terms of gender inequality can partly explain the
gaps in the economic development observed in
high and low income countries (Ferrant and Kolev
2016). Conversely, academic research underlines
the complexity, and indeed the ambiguity, of the
relationship between economic growth and gender
equality. On the one hand, while the increase
in female activity and level of education lend a
dynamic to economic development, the literature
does not allow any conclusion to be drawn about
the effects of economic growth on women’s rights
(Duflo 2012; Kabeer and Natali 2013). On the
other hand, the fact that the participation of women
in the labour market is a factor in economic
growth partly explains the massive increase of
the female workforce from the 1960s onwards,
whereas family norms and the political frame of
the male breadwinner model were unfavourable to
such a development. Nonetheless, female activity
in the workforce does not guarantee emancipation
(the same is true for men), or gender equality
if discrimination persists. The conditions under
which women are active in the labour market –
women continue to undertake the vast majority of
C© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The new spirit of neoliberalism 5
domestic and family chores – must be taken into
account.
The semantic shifts between “equality”, “par-
ity”, and “diversity” cloud the issues between the
ends (equality, individual emancipation, the respect
of fundamental rights, etc.) and the means (the
education and health systems, employment poli-
cies, policies on work/life balance, etc.). Statistical
indicators (employment rates, activity rates, etc.)
are useful, as from certain angles they shed light
on the state of societies and the conditions under
which individuals live, but they are not an end in
themselves (Supiot 2010).
Generally speaking, the macro-economic
approach focuses on the economic consequences
of female labour or, in a certain sense, the collateral
benefits which can result from equality (Duflo
2012). However, some research that evaluates the
economic cost of inequality uses this as a substitute
argument for the application of the principle of
equality. This principle is seen as having reached the
end of the line in terms of its ability to create social
progress (see in particular Ferrant and Nowacka
2015). In this context, equality then becomes a tool
at the service of economic growth (ILO-OECD-
WBG-IMF report).
The role of cost-benefit
analysis in justifying equality
policies
The current crisis calls both the financing and
the legitimacy of the welfare state into question
(Rosanvallon 1995). The survival of the welfare
state is seen as being conditional on a profound
re-foundation of how it functions. Even when a
certain level of de-commodification persists, the
redefinition of social and equality policies in the
name of economic performance questions the role
of the welfare state as an institution that “breaks
with the liberal Gesellschaft to orient itself towards
the more solidary Gemeinschaft” (Berman 2005;
Lachausse´e 2005).
In a world where resources are scarce, the cost-
benefit analysis is an indispensable tool for public
decision-making. This approach requires thinking
about the real possibility of quantifying costs and
benefits and is useful for implementing the principle
of equality to the extent that it allows the most
effective tools to be chosen to do this. Justifying
equality policies through their economic and social
performance differs from this approach to the extent
that it consists of evaluating not the effectiveness but
rather the legitimacy of equality policies in terms of
their expected consequences. In doing this, such an
approach weakens the unconditional application of
the basic principles of equality and individual eman-
cipation by making them of secondary importance.
The adoption of this type of consequentialism is part
of a new neoliberal way of thinking (Boltanski and
Chiapello 1999), analysed in this article on the basis
of three types of justification: the social investment
strategy, the performance of diversity argument, and
the profitability of the anti-discrimination struggle.
The social investment strategy
Since the 1990s, the social investment strategy has
made its presence felt in Europe as a means of
defending and reforming the welfare state and, in
particular, social protection. The strategy consists
of rethinking the missions and means of the wel-
fare state, shifting from reparatory social policies
to a so-called “active” welfare state that stresses
the preventive dimension of public policy (Reman
and Feltesse 2004). It “explicitly aims to improve
social inclusion, to avoid poverty from being trans-
mitted from one generation to the next and to
foster the adaptation of populations to contempo-
rary labor market demands. If the objectives were
attained, individuals and families would become
fully responsible for their well-being as this would
be placed on a solid financial basis derived from
professional activity and intra-familial exchanges”.
(Jenson 2011, p.23)
In public policy terms, this would manifest
itself by “paying increasing attention to children,
to human capital and to activation through employ-
ment” (Jenson 2011, p.23), thus stressing the pro-
ductive potential of social policy (Morel et al.
2012). The social investment framework is incar-
nated both in the British Labour Party’s “third
way” under Blair and Brown, inspired by Antony
Giddens (2000), and in the Swedish social democrat
approach (Morel 2013). The strategy is based on an
alliance between “adjustment to the new economic
contexts and the possibility of social progress”
(Palier 2005, p.128). It raises a number of questions
as the nature of the expected benefits calls for
clarification. If they are limited to economic gains,
the strategy risks perverting social policy from its
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initial objective (the reduction of poverty, gender
equality, etc.). In order to move beyond this purely
economic interpretation of social investment, the
political scientists Morel and Palme (2016) sug-
gest using the Sen capabilities approach to make
the expected social outcome explicit. Should this
approach be adopted, the question of quantifying
the gains expected from capabilities arises.
Measuring social profitability
The social investment strategy legitimates state
participation in financing cre`ches, health services,
the family, schools, etc. through a demonstration
of the profitability engendered by these policies for
the collective in the medium to long term. When
feasible, it is indeed relevant to evaluate the cost
and effectiveness of equality or social policies from
the perspective of the political objective targeted.
It is relevant to determine whether the policies in
question allow objectives such as gender equality,
the reduction of economic and social inequality,
the fight against poverty, etc. to be reached at
less cost. For example, it is less costly for two-
year-old children to be at school than to attend a
cre`che, but the effects of such early schooling on
the future well-being of these children should not
be neglected. The literature that evaluates different
types of structures for very young children helps
to better understand these issues so that the stated
objective (here, providing education to all children)
might be reached at less cost (Fouge`re 2016; Maurin
and Goux 2009). This is about evaluating the tool
(the type of structure which receives the children)
and not the objective itself (education and cognitive
development of the child). The issue is not to eval-
uate the financial result of the public expenditure
but rather its effectiveness in terms of the policy
objective of creating the most egalitarian access
possible to education.
Other publications that emphasise economic
and/or social performance justify the policies and,
therefore, the objective they aim to achieve. This
shift may seem trivial but it weakens equality as
a principle of justice. In the US, social policies are
being called into question as they are perceived to be
expensive and ineffective (as analysed when Aid for
Families with Dependent Children was introduced).
From the perspective of preventing social risk,
some research seeks to evaluate the benefits of pro-
grammes for young children from poorer families
in terms of a reduction in criminality and access to
employment for future employees hosted in these
programmes. Garcia, Heckman et al. (2016) have
shown that every dollar invested in quality edu-
cation for children from low-income families in
the US resulted in an annual return of 5 to
7 per cent. The aim of this approach is to build
a business case for quality care for young children.
However, proving the profitability of social policies
in all their complexity is difficult, if not impossible
(Begg 2016). In particular, the social dimension of
effectiveness questions the meaning of notions of
social cohesion and/or social capital which are hard
to define and to measure (Ponthieux 2006). How can
a causal relationship be established between a social
policy and its impact many years later after multiple
other factors have interacted? How can not only the
gains in terms of public expenditure but also the
utility and disutility of all individuals involved in
the process be integrated in the calculus?
Beyond these general issues with the rigour
of this type of long-term evaluation, determining
whether the effectiveness of a given public policy
can be evaluated has repercussions in terms of the
legitimacy (or, on the contrary, the illegitimacy)
of the policy itself. Generalising the social invest-
ment perspective may lead to a situation where
only projects whose social impact can be even
partially evaluated are selected. Yet many social
programmes cannot be evaluated. A cost-benefit
evaluation of social and equality policies thus raises
two problems: the problem of measuring the cost
and benefits, and the problem of the role played by
this calculation in public decision-making.
What role for principles of justice?
The cost-benefit approach does not minimise the
primacy of the political, provided it serves solely
to determine the best choice of tool to reach the
stated political objective. However, a dangerous
shift occurs when the border between the objective
and the tool becomes unclear. Let us return to the
example of education. As part of a republican con-
ception, education is a tool to be used for individual
emancipation as a principle of justice. Public expen-
diture on education can have no other justification
but this one. Clearly, on a global level, education
leads to positive externalities and increases the
level of human capital, which can be favourable
to economic growth and innovation. But this does
not mean that it is profitable to invest in every
individual. If profitability is used as the criterion
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to justify and arbitrate on education policies, the
idea of individual emancipation is endangered. In
his work on evaluating the profitability of pro-
grammes for impoverished children, the economist
James Heckman (2011) does not deny the ethical
dimension of these programmes, but he also sees
another means of thinking about social justice
through their economic effectiveness. On the other
hand, he admits that frequently what is just is not
economically effective. Justifying equality policies
solely by their performance thus risks neoliberal
thinking predominating and equality policies being
called into question, if it can be proved that they do
not lead to economic or social performance.
Diversified profiles in the workforce and
economic performance
The added value of gender balance and diversity
Private sector companies also use expected
profitability to justify equality policies. Showing
that companies with a largely female workforce
(particularly in decision-making positions) perform
better is an argument used to justify the integration
of women in the workplace and also in company
leadership. In particular, demonstrating the added
value of diversified profiles in the workforce serves
to legitimate quota policies among boards of direc-
tors. In the 1990s, as a result of demographic change
that inevitably led companies to recruit women
and individuals from ethno-cultural minorities, the
number of publications on managing diversity and
competitiveness expanded. In 1991, two researchers
in management, Taylor Cox and Stacy Blake (1991)
listed the advantages for private companies of
hiring employees from diverse backgrounds. They
distinguish between the “inevitable nature” of
diversity (given demographic change, broadening
the recruitment pool is inevitable) and the “advan-
tages” of diversity (marketing/creativity/problem-
solving/flexibility). A vast amount of literature
on this theme seeking to measure the added value
of workplace heterogeneity and, notably, the
feminisation of power structures has emerged,
although no consensus has yet been reached. While
some studies find that the presence of women at
decision-making level leads to a positive effect
on company results (Belghiti-Mahut and Lafont
2009; Ferrary 2009; Smith and Verner 2005),
others find no significant effects (Mohan and Chen
2004; Randoy 2006; Wolfers 2006). Finally, some
studies conclude that feminising the governance of
companies has a negative effect on their economic
performance (Adams and Ferreira 2009).
Equality in the workplace at the service of
profitability
In France, the Gender Equality Charter (2004) pro-
moted by the Ministry for Parity and Professional
Equality illustrates a shift from the legal and consti-
tutional principle of “equality in law for all citizens
without distinction on the basis of origin, race or
religion” (Article 1 of the French Constitution) and
“without distinction on the basis of gender” (pream-
ble of the French Constitution) to the rhetoric of
diversity management. The Charter presents gender
equality in employment [as] the driver of a new
dynamic, which should no longer be experienced
as a legislative and regulatory constraint but as
an opportunity, as it creates jobs, wealth and
growth.
The Charter’s reasoning is based on reports
that highlight the promotion of female eco-
nomic activity as an essential factor for growth
in developed countries (Colmou 1999; Majnoni
d’Intignano et al. 1999). With the same aim of
demonstrating the advantages of policies that favour
diversity, the Observatoire de la responsabilite´
sociale des entreprises (ORSE) has produced two
publications entitled: “Men are the future of equal-
ity in the workplace” (2009) and “Men as subjects
and actors of equality in the workplace” (2013).
These are designed to convince companies that it
is in their interest to promote gender equality. For
its part, the study carried out by ORSE with the
Association franc¸aise des managers de la diversite´
(AFMD), “Social dialogue and the management of
diversity” (Cornet 2014), justifies social dialogue
on diversity on the basis of gains made in the
economic performance of businesses.
Neo-essentialism
The linking of diversity to economic performance
is based on two postulates. The first is that there are
differences between the sexes in terms of compe-
tences (the rhetoric of specific talents, comparative
advantages, etc.), or preferences (desires, hopes,
etc.), or behaviour (rationality, altruism, attitudes
to risk, etc.). The second is the idea that each
gender complements the other, i.e. these differences
complete and enrich each gender (in terms of
productivity, for example). On this basis, diversity
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policies that reduce the degree of segregation in
social and public realms (workplace, for instance)
improve performance.
The performance argument on diversity has
both explicit and implicit implications – whether
it is claimed as strategic or not – for both the
conceptual and institutional framing of the terms
of the debate surrounding equality policies.
If it were proved that it is profitable to promote
women or, more broadly, individuals who are at risk
of being discriminated against, there is a risk that
these individuals would be even more tightly locked
into a mise en sce`ne of the differences linked to the
real or supposed group they belong to. Underlining
the added value of including such individuals is
undoubtedly a step forward compared to the historic
justification for excluding them because of their
supposed lesser value, but it also modernises their
being assigned to the status of complementarity.
They continue not to be considered as unconditional
equals (Se´nac 2017). Justifying the inclusion of
women and of the racialised not solely in the
name of the fight against discrimination, but also –
and above all – in the name of profitability and
a mise en scene of complementary identities, thus
contributes to the reproduction of a sexist and racist
order. Furthermore, in order to maintain this real or
supposed performance, the differences themselves
must be preserved to avoid the risk of losing the
added value of complementarity or diversity if they
are not. And in a scenario where it was proved that
discrimination and exclusion were profitable, what
would happen then?
The anti-discrimination struggle in terms
of profitability
The cost of discrimination?
In the same vein, the fight against discrimination
is also promoted as a means of eliminating waste
and increasing profitability. Showing the cost of
discrimination, or indeed the gains to be made
from the anti-discrimination struggle, has become
the dominant approach that aims to build the
“business case” for anti-discriminatory policies.
Thus, the OECD has proposed a composite indi-
cator of discrimination inherent to “social insti-
tutions”, SIGI (the Social Institution and Gender
Index). SIGI groups discriminatory factors into five
categories: discriminatory family code, restricted
physical integrity, son bias, restricted resources
and assets, and restricted civil liberties. Based on
measuring the degree of discrimination in institu-
tions, researchers have estimated the cost of such
discrimination in several countries (Ferrant and
Kolev 2016). According to this research, the loss
of revenue caused by this type of discrimination
amounts to 16 per cent of GDP worldwide. The anti-
discrimination struggle will lead to a yearly growth
rise in GDP worldwide of between 0.03 per cent and
0.6 per cent until 2030, according to the scenarios
retained. Similarly, an FMI paper (Gonzales et al.
2015) shows that laws which restrict women’s rights
in a number of domains (property inheritance laws,
freedom to work, to open a bank account, etc.) have
a negative impact on GDP. The authors cautiously
recommend that these hindrances to economic
development be lifted, without nonetheless wishing
to cause offence to the cultures and religious norms
proper to the countries in question (Gonzales et al.
2015).
In 2015, the French government asked France
Strate´gie, an expert-led think-tank under the aus-
pices of the Prime Minister, to estimate the eco-
nomic cost of discrimination. This request was
part of the May 2015 plan to combat discrimi-
nation in hiring practices and in the workplace,
which itself was the prolongation of a report made
by a stakeholder dialogue group on combatting
discrimination in the workplace in private sector
companies. In the engagement letter, the ministers
heading the taskforce and elected politicians justi-
fied the request by stating that “from an economic
point of view, discrimination leads to a shortfall as
much for the victims as for society as a whole”
(France Strate´gie 2016a, p.81). Although it was
cited as an indisputable preamble, the principle of
equality is considered as not or no longer sufficient
to convince “the actors and the public” that it
merited being applied. In the report published in
September 2016, France Strate´gie concluded that
discrimination is costly: according to the report,
the underuse of available human capital deprives
society of a source of wealth equivalent to four to
ten points of GDP. These conclusions are similar to
the analysis also published by France Strate´gie one
month previously (August 2016), that legitimised
equal opportunity policies as a result of showing
themselves to be “an important potential for growth
and the reduction of inequality” (France Strate´gie
2016b, p.7). The report affirmed that inequality in
hiring practices and on the job which occurs “to the
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detriment of women or individuals from immigrant
populations (the ‘second generation’) has a negative
impact on the level of wealth created” and that “the
establishment of equitable access to the labor mar-
ket and equalising the conditions of employment
(wages, length of contracts) would significantly
increase growth” (France Strate´gie 2016b, p.7).
The report estimated that, “by better distribut-
ing talent and by removing barriers to access to
employment, the anti-discrimination struggle could
increase GDP by around 7% annually” (around
150 billion euros).
What happens if what is just is not profitable?
In his foreword to the report on The Economic
Cost of Discrimination, the Chief Commissioner
of France Strate´gie, Jean Pisani-Ferry, who joined
the presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron’s
campaign team in January 2017, affirmed that if
proof were provided that discrimination “benefitted
the economy, it would nonetheless not be accept-
able” (France Strate´gie 2016a, p.3). He continued:
As it happens however, discrimination is punitive
from an economic point of view, its cost to the
collective is high and therefore eliminating discrim-
ination would over time lead to substantial gains in
growth and in revenue. (France Strate´gie 2016a,
p.3)
This authoritative argument is not sufficient,
however, to put an end to the primacy of the
economic over the political. If estimating the eco-
nomic performance of equality policies is taken
into account, there is no guarantee that the answer
will be straightforward and unequivocal. The cost-
benefit analysis of equality policies may well lead
to the conclusion that they are not profitable. Thus,
at a macroeconomic level, some studies have shown
that discrimination against women in the work-
force increases the attraction of certain countries
in terms of foreign direct investment and, therefore,
the economic dynamism of those countries. The
economist Ste´phanie Seguino (2000) shows that in
semi-industrialised countries with open economies
that are heavily involved in globalisation (e.g.,
Thailand and Taiwan), discrimination in the work-
force stimulates economic growth. In these coun-
tries, the difference in male-female wages is higher
than the gaps in productivity between the genders,
which makes these countries attractive to foreign
investment. The lower labour costs of women are
therefore a source of profit.
The win-win illusion
Justifying the anti-discrimination struggle in the
name of profitability is based on an incorrect vision
of the discriminatory process, the “win-win” idea.
According to this idea, combatting discrimination
is beneficial to all: the individuals who are at risk of
discrimination or not, private sector companies, and
society as a whole. The win-win idea is based on
the notion that there is a convergence between the
political and legal objectives of equality, the ethical
objectives to achieve a decent society, and the
economic objectives of an effective and productive
society. It reduces implementing the principle of
equality to a simple question of resource allocation
(in particular the labour factor). In this vein,
inequalities are perceived as misallocations of
resources that hamper economic growth and reduce
company profits. However, the real problem is
the redistribution of resources. The example of
persistent gender-based discrimination is all the
more revealing of the confusion between these two
questions as in twenty-first century France, gender
equality as an objective is no longer an issue even
if the precise meaning of equality continues to be a
controversial topic. The fact that for the same type
of work and with equal competence women are less
well paid than men is condemned across the board.
If a woman is discriminated against on the grounds
of her gender and she does not get a position which
she is fully competent to occupy, her human capital
is underused. In reality, the position she should
have had access to has been given to someone
else. There is therefore a gain to the advantage
of someone else, whereas in a world without
discrimination the gain would be hers in the form
of a promotion. In other words, if discrimination
were to disappear there would be winners but there
would also be losers. The relevant question is about
the just redistribution of resources and wealth and
not about the costs linked to an under-usage of
human capital. The anti-discrimination struggle
may or may not increase the size of the pie. That
is not the question. The question is about the just
sharing of the pie – independently of its size.
Conclusion
The apparent pragmatism of the economic promo-
tion of equality policies or of the anti-discrimination
struggle is part of a twofold misconception: the
illusion of consensus (Mouffe 2016) and of the
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“win-win” scenario. If what is “just” is profitable,
why abandon such an argument, such a pow-
erful and therefore unquestionable justification?
Precisely because on the contrary, the argument
is questionable given that if it were proved that
discrimination is profitable, arguing with authority
that such proof is unacceptable would not undo
the damage done. Equality is not a principle if it
is subject to the demonstration of performance. A
cost-benefit analysis applied to political choices,
and not to the tools used to implement them, leads
to the creation of a hierarchy between those choices
and indeed to the exclusion of some of them. The
means accorded to public policy are then deter-
mined depending on whether the objective pursued
is profitable or not. In such a scenario, the least
costly and most profitable political objectives are
then selected for implementation. Those which are
deemed to be too costly or those whose economic
value cannot be calculated can be abandoned with
justification. In such circumstances, profitability
becomes a selection process for objectives and
principles rather than a tool for the allocation
of resources to the objectives themselves. “Why
should we do this?” then becomes determined
and conditioned by “what should we do?” and
“how should we do it?” to the detriment of any
underlying principle. If the struggle against gender-
based discrimination were more “profitable” than
the struggle against discrimination on the basis of
ethnic origin, would that justify the establishment
of a hierarchy among equality policies? If it were
proved that discrimination is profitable, what would
happen? Justifying equality policies in the name
of profitability is a negation of both the structural
dimension of inequality and the damage done to
individuals who suffer discrimination and their
legitimate calls for justice. Such justification paves
the way for an objection to equality policies on
the basis that they are not profitable from a cost-
benefit perspective. More generally, this means
the submission of political objectives to economic
objectives (Supiot 2015). Basing the justification
of equality on the notion of economic and social
performance thus contributes to the new spirit of
neo-liberalism.
Notes
1. In economics, an agent is a
decision-maker in a specific model.
2. « Conqueˆte sociale » to quote
Fontaine (2014).
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